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A WTO if you can keep it 
Steve Charnovitz* 
1. The place of the WTO in international economic law
In September 1787, the inventor and free trader Benjamin Franklin 
emerged from the convention in Philadelphia that had just completed 
drafting the United States (US) Constitution. A lady awaiting outside the 
State House approached Franklin to ask whether the convention had cre-
ated a republic or a monarchy. Whereupon Franklin replied, ‘A republic 
if you can keep it.’1 In 1994, when the drafting of the WTO was com-
pleted in Marrakesh, I am not aware that anyone in the crowd waiting 
outside asked European Trade Minister Leon Brittan what form of inter-
national trade governance had been created. Had that question been 
asked, one can imagine the cerebral Lord Brittan paraphrasing Franklin’s 
optimistic, yet hedged, answer and replying: ‘A World Trade Organiza-
tion if you can keep it.’ 
To the Question of whether there is a ‘meaningful place’ for the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in the ‘Future of International Eco-
nomic Law’, the answer is an unabashed yes. Bringing order to interna-
tional trade was always part of the past of international economic law 
(IEcL). So, there is little reason to doubt that a world trading system will 
be a crucial part of the future of IEcL. 
This essay examines the stresses on the WTO in the broader context 
of the trends in IEcL and US economic policy. The essay has four parts: 
section 1 summarises the origin of and legalisation in the multilateral 
trading system. Section 2 provides an assessment of the performance of 
the WTO and its leading members, particularly with regard to the US–
China trade war. Section 3 looks at the pushback against trade and 
against international law. Section 4 presents a plan for strengthening the 
WTO. 
* Steve Charnovitz teaches on the Faculty of Law at George Washington University
in Washington, DC. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the 
American Law Institute. This article is current as of 10 November 2019. 
1 See <www.bartleby.com/73/1593.html>. 
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Although the term IEcL originated in the 20th century,2 the quest for 
a rule of law3 in global trade goes back to the 19th century, if not earlier. 
Some key legal stepping stones during the 19th century include the Zoll-
verein and its treaties starting in 1834,4 the sugar bounty convention in 
1864, and the resolutions on customs and reciprocity of the First Pan-
American Conference in 1890.5 The year 1890 also brought the first in-
ternational organisation for trade, the International Union for the Publi-
cation of Customs Tariffs.6 
The early 20th century raised the ambition for a rule-based interna-
tional legal system. In 1911, the French diplomat Max Jarousse de Sillac 
advocated ‘an organization legislative, judicial and administrative in char-
acter.’7 The purpose of the ‘legislative international organization’ would 
be to promote the ‘security of states’ and ‘the welfare of nations.’8 The 
judicial character would entail a ‘court of international justice’ with four 
chambers including a chamber for customs questions.9 In 1916, US Con-
gressman Cordell Hull proposed a ‘permanent international trade con-
gress’ to consider national practices: 
‘which in their effects are calculated to create destructive commercial 
controversies or bitter economic wars, and to formulate agreements with 
respect thereto, designed to eliminate and avoid the injurious results and 
dangerous possibilities of economic warfare, and to promote fair and 
friendly trade relations among all the nations of the world.’10 
The visions of Sillac and Hull were in part achieved by the Treaty of 
Versailles which established a League of Nations and called for future 
2 S Charnovitz, ‘What is International Economic Law?’ (2011) 14 J Int’l Economic 
L 3, 12. 
3 By a rule of law, I refer to public law. For private law in international trade, lex 
mercatoria harks back to antiquity. 
4 WO Henderson, ‘The Zollverein’ (1934) 19(73) History 1–19. 
5 P Reinsch, Public International Unions (Ginn and Company 1911) 79–82. 
6 As the British political theorist Leonard S Woolf pointed out, the Union originated 
from proposals by individuals and associations beginning in 1853. LS Woolf, 
International Government (Fabian Society 1916) 155. 
7 MJ de Sillac, ‘Periodical Peace Conferences’ (1911) 5 AJIL 968, 979. Sillac had 
served as one of the Secretaries of the First Hague Peace Conference. 
8 ibid 980. 
9 ibid 983–84. 
10 C Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol I (Macmillan 1948) 82. 
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conventions to ‘secure and maintain … equitable treatment for all com-
merce’ of League members.11 
In pursuit of that goal, the League launched negotiations for the Con-
vention for the Simplification of Customs Formalities with its stated aim 
that ‘commercial relations shall not be hindered by excessive, unneces-
sary or arbitrary Customs or other similar formalities.’12 In this Conven-
tion of 1923, Governments agreed: 
- to provide ‘equitable treatment’ in customs and similar regulations;
- to ‘publish promptly all regulations relating to Customs’ in such a
manner ‘as to enable persons concerned to become acquainted with 
them’; 
- to ensure that the issuance of licenses ‘should be carried out with
the least possible delay’; 
- to secure agreements with regard to ‘technical conditions’ of trade,
such as purity, quality, and ‘sanitary condition’; and 
- to regularly report national progress to the League of Nations.13
In addition, the Convention included an undertaking by countries ‘to 
prevent the arbitrary or unjust application of their laws and regulations 
with regard to Customs and other similar matters, and to ensure redress 
by administrative, judicial or arbitral procedure for those who may have 
been prejudiced by such abuses.’14 For this specific undertaking, parties 
had a right to refer a ‘dispute’ to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ).15 
The problem of import bans became the topic of the next round of 
international negotiations when cooperating Governments formulated 
the International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export 
Prohibitions and Restrictions.16 Under this Convention of 1927, Govern-
ments declared that ‘a return to the effective liberty of international 
11 Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, 112 BFSP 1, art 23(e). 
12 International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, 3 
November 1923, 30 LNTS 372, art 1. 
13 ibid arts 2, 3, 4, 9, 13, 16. 
14 ibid art 7. 
15 ibid art 22. 
16 International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and 
Restrictions, 8 November 1927, 97 LNTS 391 (not in force). 
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commerce is one of the primary conditions of world prosperity’ and, to 
that end, agreed ‘to abolish’ all import and export prohibitions and re-
strictions.17 This abolition requirement was subject to a list of exceptions 
to be available only if such measures ‘are not applied in such a manner as 
to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade.’18 The Convention further provided that in imposing any 
‘measure of prohibition or restriction’ against products of any foreign 
country, a Government would ‘frame the measure in a way as to cause 
the least possible injury to the trade of the other Contracting Parties.’19 
This least-trade-restrictiveness requirement was to be enforced through 
PCIJ adjudication. Although the international community, including the 
US, made heroic efforts to put the 1927 Prohibitions Convention into 
force, these efforts ultimately failed. 
Notwithstanding this speed bump, the incipient trading system had 
by 1927 formulated numerous international trade norms that, 20 years 
later, served as key components of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). The 1923 and 1927 conventions provided norms on: na-
tional treatment on customs, timely licensing, technical conditions of 
trade, import bans, domestic administrative law, domestic transparency, 
centralised reporting, and international20 adjudication. Had economic 
amity not shattered in the early 1930s, the post-World War I efforts for 
a trading system might have succeeded. 
Viewed from the present, the most prominent trade norms missing in 
1927 were the general21 most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, the com-
mitment to reciprocal reduction of tariffs, the disciplining of subsidies, 
 
17 ibid Preamble, art 2. 
18 ibid art 4. Among the exceptions were prohibitions imposed on ‘moral or 
humanitarian grounds’ or to protect animals and plants from ‘degeneration or extinction’ 
(ibid, art 4 and Ad Article 4). There was also a carve out for ‘prison made goods’ (ibid, 
Protocol s 6). Another exception existed for measures to protect ‘the vital interests of the 
country’ provided they are applied so as ‘not to lead to any arbitrary discrimination 
against any other High Contracting Party’ (ibid art 5). 
19 ibid art 7. 
20 Here, I mean adjudication in a multilateral context. Dispute resolution in bilateral 
commercial treaties began centuries earlier. For example, a treaty between Bologna and 
Ferrara in 1193 included a rule to stabilise tariff duties and provide for a mixed 
commission of representatives to resolve differing interpretations. AP Sereni, The Italian 
Conception of International Law (Columbia University Press 1943) 12. 
21 For centuries, MFN had been negotiated as a bilateral trade obligation. 
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and the establishment of an international organisation overseeing the 
trading system. The need to codify MFN was recognised at the Interna-
tional Economic Conference of 1927 and analytical work ensued over the 
next several years in the League’s Economic Committee.22 But achieving 
MFN and the other goals became a task for the post World War II re-
construction of the international legal system. 
In 1946, the United Nations (UN) launched a multilateral negotiation 
on ‘trade and employment’ that formulated both the provisional GATT 
and what was to be a permanent International Trade Organization 
(ITO).23 A key advance in the GATT was to impose non-discrimination 
rules covering both MFN and national treatment. In addition, the GATT 
enshrined a commitment for future tariff negotiations. 
The ITO Charter of 1948 included the GATT rules plus additional 
rules on employment policy, labour standards, economic development, 
investment, restrictive business practices, and many other issues.24 The 
ITO also contained an organisational structure and elaborate dispute 
procedures with compulsory jurisdiction. Like the 1927 Prohibitions 
Convention, the ITO Charter failed to go into force. For that matter, the 
GATT did not go into force either. But the GATT was successfully ap-
plied provisionally from 1947 until 1995 when it was replaced by the 
WTO. 
Although the WTO did not come into being until 1995, most of the 
key provisions in the WTO’s constitution have roots in the gradual blos-
soming of the trading system beginning in the early 20th century. The key 
features of the WTO are: the rules on goods, services, and intellectual 
property;25 a commitment to reciprocal trade negotiations; an institution 
to make intergovernmental decisions; dispute settlement with compul-
sory jurisdiction; and enforcement of dispute panel decisions via a sus-
pension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO). The adoption of 
 
22 Economic and Financial Committees of the League of Nations, Commercial Policy 
in the Postwar World (League of Nations 1945) 14, 68. 
23 DA Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (U Chicago Press 2017) 471–84. 
24 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization [ITO Charter], 24 March 
1948 (not in force), <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm>. 
25 National treatment for ‘intellectual property’ had been required in some early 20th 
century bilateral trade agreements. See, for example, the Commercial Treaty between 
Estonia and Hungary, 19 October 1922, 30 LNTS 349, art 5. What was new in the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was the commitment 
to an international standard for providing intellectual property rights to foreign nationals. 
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multilateral trade rules, including a juridical procedure for trade dis-
putes, goes back to 1923. Governments agreed in 1948 to establish a 
functional international organisation for trade, but that effort was sty-
mied after the US Congress repeated in 1949 the kind of isolationist blun-
der the US Senate had committed in 1919 when it rejected US entry into 
the League of Nations.26 The formalisation of the GATT into a trade or-
ganisation was considered in the 1960s, but it was not until 1994 that the 
leading trade powers came together to constitutionalise the WTO at the 
Marrakesh Conference. 
Thus, the WTO was the culmination of decades of stop and go efforts 
by Governments to concretise a world trading system based on the rule 
of law and led by a multilateral organisation. The WTO is well-designed 
as the embodiment of the world trade community’s hopes for a ‘more 
viable and durable multilateral trading system.’27 Ideally, we will be able 
to keep it. 
 
 
2.  The disappointing performance of the WTO and its members 
 
From its inception, the WTO drew controversy. Like any interna-
tional organisation, its future is subject to changing political vicissitudes. 
The WTO suffered a low point in 1999 in the collapse of the Seattle Min-
isterial Conference that was caused in part by disagreements among 
countries about the role of worker rights in future WTO negotiations. 
The WTO enjoyed its high point in 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence when Governments, in a brief moment of global solidarity shortly 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, approved an ambitious negotiating 
agenda for a new trade round. 
Despite years of efforts, the WTO failed to complete its first trade 
round. (By contrast, the GATT held seven successful trade rounds.) 
What came to be known as the Doha Development Round is now dead.28 
As with the death of Caesar, an autopsy would show multiple wounds. 
The fatal wound to Doha was inflicted by the US Government which 
 
26 See JH Jackson, S Charnovitz, ‘The Structure and Function of the World Trade 
Organization’ in K Heydon, S Woolcock (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to 
International Trade Policy (Ashgate 2012) 390. 
27 Marrakesh Agreement, Preamble. 
28 J Bacchus, The Willing World (CUP 2018) 102–03. 
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lacked the vision and generosity to contemplate a trade round that would 
bestow its benefits on developing countries. Rather than vitalising the 
WTO’s legislative branch for seeking a global deal, the US preferred to 
pursue bilateral and regional trade arrangements outside of the WTO. 
Even worse than how the US neglected the WTO’s legislative branch, 
the US has also actively undermined the WTO’s judicial branch. Begin-
ning in 2016, the US began a practice of blocking appointments to the 
WTO’s Appellate Body. As of early November 2019, the US attack on 
the Appellate Body continues, and in just a month, not only will the 
WTO lose this organ, but it will also lose the ‘security and predictabil-
ity’29 of its Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).30 
In providing a second-level review to litigants who request it, the 
Standing Appellate Body is a vital part of the DSU’s judicial machinery. 
Before an original or compliance panel report can be adopted by the Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB), the DSU provides an opportunity for ap-
peal. By dismembering the WTO appellate court, the US Government 
can disable the machinery so that a panel report is no longer eligible to 
be adopted by the DSB. In other words, a WTO member Government 
who has lost a dispute as a defendant will now be able to engage in the 
strategic misbehaviour of blocking the adoption of a ruling against it. In-
ternational legal scholar Joost Pauwelyn has called this blocking tech-
nique ‘appeals into the void’31 because a WTO defendant would be able 
to intentionally appeal knowing that such an appeal would freeze the ad-
judication. 
As the WTO member that has historically been the most likely to be 
a losing WTO dispute defendant, the US has – with the narrow logic of 
defendant self-interest – struck back to trigger the ongoing WTO judicial 
branch crisis. The Trump Administration’s attack on the Appellate Body 
achieves two narrowminded goals at once: first, striking at the interna-
tional rule of law; and second, preventing any further WTO legal deci-
sions against the parade of US protectionist measures and other unethical 
 
29 Art 3(2) DSU. 
30 M Wagner, ‘The Impending Demise of the WTO Appellate Body: From 
Centrepiece to Historical Relic?’ in C Lo, J Nakagawa, T Chen (eds), The Appellate Body 
of the WTO and its Reform (Springer 2019) 67–90. 
31 J Pauwelyn, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect? What Choice 
to Make?’ (7 July 2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3415964>. 
          ZOOM OUT 
 
trade practices that have been struck down by the Appellate Body since 
1996. 
In an essay about the WTO I authored in early 2005 for the inaugural 
issue of the Journal of International Law & International Relations, I con-
ducted a futures assessment to predict what the state of the WTO would 
be 15 years hence. The title of my essay was ‘The World Trade Organi-
zation in 2020.’32 Now that 2020 is almost here, let me note briefly one of 
the scenarios I discussed in 2005. In what I labelled the ‘pessimistic sce-
nario,’ I painted the possibility ‘that the Doha Round fails to reach frui-
tion’ and that the ‘WTO deteriorates and becomes ineffective.’33 I pos-
ited that ‘[i]f WTO members demonstrate an inability to write any new 
rules, that could lead to serious organizational instability.’34 Looking at 
the US, I considered the possibility of a ‘retreat from international en-
gagements such as the WTO’ and suggested that a ‘United States repul-
sion to the trading system might be driven by continued losses in WTO 
disputes.’35 While I noted that ‘[i]f any country could walk out [of the 
WTO] it would be the United States,’ I opined that such a departure 
‘seems almost inconceivable.’36 Furthermore, I declared that ‘I do not 
foresee any serious unravelling of WTO dispute settlement.’37 My essay 
also coloured in an optimistic scenario, but then concluded: ‘The reality 
is that the WTO of 2020 will not fall into dystopia, nor blossom into a 
truly progressive international organization.’38 
Looking back at my predictions made in 2005, I see now that my 
‘pessimistic’ scenario was too optimistic. I did not foresee the wave of 
political threats to the WTO from US protectionists and sovereigntists. I 
did not foresee the blame the trading system would receive for trends 
toward inequality in income patterns. I did not foresee the degeneration 
of international law that was to occur over the next 15 years. But I did 
not let my weak vision of the future impede my observation of the 
 
32 S Charnovitz, ‘The World Trade Organization in 2020’ (2005) 1 J Int’l L. & Int’l 
Relations 167–89. 
33 ibid 180. 
34 ibid 181. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid 182. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid 188. 
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present. I stayed vigilant to detecting new threats to the trading system, 
especially from the US Trade Representative (USTR). 
In 2016, I called out the Obama Administration for shamelessly abus-
ing the WTO consensus rule to block the reappointment of a distin-
guished Korean jurist to the WTO Appellate Body.39 The USTR under 
Obama was miffed that the Korean appellator had co-authored WTO 
decisions against US protectionist measures. This US attack on judicial 
independence led me to animadvert upon USTR’s scheme. I urged that 
‘the Obama Administration should apologize to the WTO for the dam-
age USTR has caused and the Administration should support the enact-
ment of a DSB normative statement to depoliticize reappointments of 
WTO judges.’40 
 Unfortunately, the Obama Administration did not back down and 
USTR did not depoliticise its stance toward Appellate Body. In retro-
spect, one can see that USTR was test driving its capacity to block Ap-
pellate Body appointments. When the Trump Administration took over 
in 2017, I was dismayed to see the Administration relying on some of the 
same anti-WTO USTR bureaucrats that had caused so much trouble dur-
ing the Obama Administration. 
By summer 2017, the Trump Administration’s battle plans against the 
Appellate Body had taken shape: the US would now block all appellator 
appointments. Given the clear consensus requirement in the DSU (Arti-
cle 2(4)) for making Appellate Body appointments, I reflected over sev-
eral weeks on whether any counter-strategies were available to outfox the 
Trump Administration. By November 2017, I devised a solution to the 
looming WTO crisis. 
Since the consensus requirement prevented any solution from the 
DSB, I realised that the only hope to save the DSU was to secure action 
by an entity that had the authority to engage in non-consensus rulemak-
ing. The only such DSU entity is the Appellate Body. Sadly, the Appellate 
Body could not save itself. But I ratiocinated that the Appellate Body 
could act to insulate the machinery for adopting panel reports. Hoping 
 
39 S Charnovitz, ‘The Obama Administration’s Attack on Appellate Body 
Independence Shows the Need for Reforms’ (International Economic Law and Policy 





to promote my solution while there was still time to implement it (that is, 
before the Appellate Body would lose its quorum no later than Septem-
ber 2018), I wrote an article for the International Economic Law and Pol-
icy Blog titled ‘How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump 
Administration.’41 I chose the Blog because I know that this news service 
is read in the WTO and in the Geneva missions. My article was dated 3 
November 2017. 
The solution I offered was for the Appellate Body to install a safety 
valve in the machinery that requires it to adjudicate appeals before a 
panel report can be adopted. Specifically, I urged the Appellate Body to 
amend its Working Procedures ‘to state that in the event of three or more 
expired terms in the Appellate Body membership, the Appellate Body 
will be unable to accept any new appeals,’ and, therefore, if any case is 
appealed after that point, then the ‘completion of the appeal’ under DSU 
Article 16(4) will ‘occur automatically on the same day that any new ap-
peal is lodged.’42 As I explained in 2017, ‘by removing itself from the dis-
pute process for new cases, a disabled Appellate Body will step aside so 
that the panel decision can automatically be adopted by the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body on a timely basis.’ In urging the Appellate Body ‘to 
erect this defense before it is too late,’ I remarked that the Appellate Body 
‘could, in effect call the Trump Administration’s bluff.’ What I meant 
was that the existential threat to the WTO was not so much that the Ap-
pellate Body would be shut down as that the automaticity of adoption of 
WTO panel reports would be shut down. If the Trump Administration 
were put on notice in late 2017 that merely by shutting down the Appel-
late Body, the US would not be able to prevent WTO panel decisions 
against it from being adopted, I thought it possible that the Administra-
tion would back away from its threat. In calling for immediate rulemak-
ing by the Appellate Body in November 2017, I envisioned a fail-safe that 
would be triggered when the number of appellator vacancies rose from 
two to three.43 
41 S Charnovitz, 'How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump 




43 In other words, under my plan, the loss of appealability would have begun in late 
2017 rather than in late 2019. 
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Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not adopt my proposal while 
there was still time to do so. Why not? No sitting appellator has informed 
me of the reason why the Appellate Body failed to act. I can speculate on 
two possibilities. First, the Appellate Body may have thought my solution 
was ultra vires and that Governments would object to the Appellate Body 
seeking to terminate an appeal without actually deciding it. I admit that 
my solution is close to the edge of legality44 but, in my view, desperate 
times sometimes demand exigent solutions. And whether or not my pro-
posal was technically ultra vires, no constitutional court exists in the 
WTO to strike down Appellate Body rulemaking.45 The second explana-
tion for inaction is that the Appellate Body imagined itself as too im-
portant to be destroyed. The proverb ‘Pride goeth before destruction’46 
comes to mind. 
During the past two years, I have participated in numerous insider 
workshops that have tossed about ideas on what to do about the Appel-
late Body crisis. On the few occasions when my own proposal was dis-
cussed, I suggested that the unique status of the Appellate Body gave it a 
common law duty to rescue the DSB. Other than my solution, no other 
fixes existed to maintain the DSU’s automaticity of panel adoption. Nev-
ertheless, not a single WTO member Government supported my pro-
posal. 
Instead, the workshops discussed various inter se agreements among 
likeminded Governments. For example, a group of Governments could 
mutually agree not to appeal. Or a group of Governments could mutually 
agree to set up an extra-DSU appellate mechanism.47 While such solu-
tions may be useful as far as they go, they do not go very far. Under the 
breakdown of the DSU that the US has engineered, the US can now ren-
der itself immune from losing in WTO dispute settlement. Of course, 
 
44 Art 17(12) DSU calls for the Appellate Body to ‘address each of the issues raised’, 
which it would be failing to do under my proposal. But such failure was already inevitable 
as a result of the US scheme. 
45 If such a court existed, there would be a need to consider whether such rulemaking 
by the Appellate Body is defensible under the law of necessity. 
46 Proverbs 16:18. 
47 As I have noted, the main problems with an extra-WTO appellate mechanism are: 
(1) lack of authoritativeness of ad hoc appeals, (2) potential incoherence of WTO law 
whose interpretation will be handed off to separate adjudicators who might issue 
inconsistent final judgments, and (3) non-adoptability of awards and consequently the 
unavailability of WTO enforcement. 
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immunity is not the same thing as invulnerability because other countries 
can copy the US in rendering themselves immune from the rule of law. 
When law breaks down, the community suffers. To quote John Locke 
(1689): ‘Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed 
to another’s harm ….’48 
Both in the workshops and in the public fora, the key advice I con-
stantly offer is that other WTO members should not make the situation 
worse by offering to appease the Trump Administration. As history has 
shown, the appeasement of dictators never works. Unfortunately, I con-
tinue to see many Governments shortsightedly seeking to reach compro-
mises with the US that involve making legislative changes to the DSU to 
reduce the judicial independence of the Appellate Body.49 Nothing could 
be more foolish than to rush through hastily considered DSU amend-
ments. As I wrote recently on the International Economic Law and Policy 
Blog: 
 
‘I would caution against a scholastic exercise that assumes the validity 
of any of the US government’s objections to WTO dispute settlement. 
The United States government operates more and more on the assump-
tion that if they can continue to repeat false statements [then] everyone 
will eventually accept them as true. This style of argument should not 
be accepted for the WTO anymore more than it should be accepted for 
climate change or any of the other foreign and domestic policy issues for 
which repeated falsehoods are the order of the day.’50 
 
 
48 See Online Library of Liberty, <https://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/115>. 
49 For example, the US has criticised appellate jurisprudence that scrutinises the 
objectivity of a panel’s assessment of the facts. To prevent such scrutiny, the US seeks to 
diminish authority of appellators to assure an adequate factual basis for their decisions. 
In my view, the right solution to the problem of an inadequacy of facts is not for 
governments to further narrow the WTO appellate power, but rather to expand that 
power by giving the Appellate Body remand authority. 
50 See my comment of 1 October 2019 to J Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of the Secretariat in 
WTO Dispute Settlement (and the AB Crisis)’ (International Economic Law and Policy 
Blog, 26 September 2019) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/09/the-role-of-the-
secretariat-in-wto-dispute-settlement-and-the-ab-crisis.html>. 
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I have also pointed out that the only way to appease the US would be 
to formally render it exempt from losing any more WTO cases.51 To me, 
such a concession is too high of a price to pay. But if WTO members are 
looking for a viable formula for appeasement, offering such immunity 
would probably be enough to get the US to agree to allow the Appellate 
Body to continue its operations. 
Over the past century, US officials have brooded over the prospect 
of having international tribunals review US compliance with its interna-
tional legal obligations. In 1919, the US refused to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles in part because of the compliance review procedures in the In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO). Concern was expressed in the 
US Senate about small nations with black representatives (eg, Haiti) be-
ing able to sit on tribunals to enforce ILO conventions against the US.52 
During the following decade, the US failed to join the PCIJ. The country 
enjoyed a cycle of internationalism after Pearl Harbor, but even so, it 
failed to join the ITO in 1949. In 1985, the Reagan Administration with-
drew general US consent to compulsory jurisdiction by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).53 In that decade and thereafter, the US failed to 
join the Law of the Sea Convention in part over concerns about its Tri-
bunal. In 1999 and thereafter, the US refused to join the International 
Criminal Court. In 2005, the Bush Administration withdrew certain spe-
cific US consent to ICJ jurisdiction.54 Thus, in the period since 1995, the 
US consent in the DSU to compulsory DSB jurisdiction has become more 
divergent from the contemporary practice by the country to reject juris-
diction of international tribunals over it. 
The capacity of WTO courts to expose the WTO-illegality of new US 
tariff-making is a significant irritant to a US Government bent on erecting 
new protectionism. The bite of WTO review can be better appreciated 
when one realises that there are no US domestic constitutional controls 
 
51 The language I have suggested is: ‘Recognizing American exceptionalism, the DSB 
shall not adopt any report finding a violation by the United States of any WTO 
agreement.’ 
52 E McKillen, ‘Integrating Labor into the Narrative of Wilsonian Internationalism: 
A Literature Review’ (2010) 34 Diplomatic History 643, 661. 
53 The Reagan Administration withdrew after the ICJ accepted jurisdiction in a case 
by Nicaragua against the US regarding the US secret war against Nicaragua. 
54 The Bush Administration withdrew after losing the ICJ case by Mexico against the 
US regarding US violations of consular rights. 
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against protecting one industry at the expense of another.55 In that re-
gard, the 19th century American Constitution of the Confederate States 
was superior because it prohibited the Congress from granting bounties 
on exports or imposing duties in order to ‘promote or foster any branch 
of industry.’56 
The value-added from any international organisation is to inspire and 
empower the better angels of its member Governments. This insight 
arose as early as 1909, when the American political scientist Paul Reinsch 
explained that a State will ‘avail itself of the advantages offered by inter-
national organization’ to enable ‘the expansion of the sphere of the na-
tional government … for the purpose of securing the greatest possible 
advantages for the individual citizen’.57 Although an international organ-
isation does manifest some volition of its own, in general an organization 
acts as an agent. Therefore, its capacity to act is shaped by the (mis)be-
haviour of its member Governments. An international organisation can-
not act with much greater rectitude than its members do. Furthermore, 
one leading member of an international organisation can have a dispro-
portionate influence in eroding the organisation from within, especially 
one like the WTO that reaches decisions via consensus. 
 
 
3.  The pushback against international trade and against international law 
 
Since the WTO was founded in 1994, the dark clouds and winds have 
rolled against it. The most consequential trend is that trade is under re-
newed attack by those who believe economic fundamentals have changed 
since 1774 when Benjamin Franklin observed that ‘No nation was ever 
ruined by trade.’58 What has supposedly changed? The assertions 
abound: trade impedes economic development, impedes national secu-
rity, impedes domestic income equity, impedes human rights, etc. And 
 
55 S Cho, ‘Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on Trade 
Politics’ (2007) 42 Wake Forest L Rev 167–97. 
56 Constitution of the Confederate States (11 March 1861) 
<https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csa.asp>. 
57 P Reinsch, ‘International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty’ (1909) 3 
AJIL 1, 12, 15. 
58 Founders’ Quotes, <https://foundersquotes.com/founding-fathers-quote/no-
nation-was-ever-ruined-by-trade-even-seemingly-the-most-disadvantageous/>. 
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thus, for these reasons, trade should no longer be determined by individ-
ual voluntary choices in the market, but rather should be managed by 
politicians and bureaucrats acting in their own interests. 
To be sure, ideas of this sort have always circulated,59 but such spur-
ious claims about the flaws of trade are more salient today than they were 
25 or 50 years ago. For example, US Secretaries of State have traditionally 
been champions of trade. But not in the Trump Administration. In May 
2019, US Secretary of State Michael R Pompeo lamented that ‘We 
bought into trade agreements that helped hollow out our middle class.’60 
Today, international trade and trade agreements are more commonly ma-
ligned as a cause of social and economic ills than as a partial solution for 
ameliorating such ills. 
Another trend is that IEcL itself is under attack.61 The Trump Ad-
ministration is waging war against IEcL, and in that war, the WTO is one 
of the main theatres of conflict. Besides the assault on WTO dispute set-
tlement discussed above, the Trump Administration has also stepped up 
its defiance of WTO rules through numerous US ‘policies inconsistent 
with free and fair trade ….’62 These include US tariffs under Sections 201, 
232, and 301 of US trade law and the proliferating use of US tariffs to 
carry out WTO-illegal trade remedies.63 Such economic aggression by the 
US in peacetime is unprecedented. In recent months, the US Govern-
ment’s ‘behavior has become even more aggressive and destabilizing.’64 
Borrowing the words of President Trump, ‘[s]uch disregard for adher-
ence to WTO rules, including the likely disregard of any future rules, 
cannot continue to go unchecked.’65 
 
59 DA Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton 1996). 
60 MR Pompeo, ‘A Foreign Policy from the Founding’ (11 May 2019) 
<www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-claremont-institute-40th-anniversary-gala-a-foreign-
policy-from-the-founding/>. 
61 E-U Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing 
2012). 
62 See M Pence, ‘Frederic V Malek Memorial Lecture’, Wilson Center, 24 October 
2019. 
63 For details of US trade actions, see S Charnovitz, ‘How American Rejectionism 
Undermines International Economic Law’ (2018) 10 Trade L & Development 226–69. 
64 See Pence (n 62). 
65 White House, Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World 
Trade Organization (26 July 2019) <www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ 
memorandum-reforming-developing-country-status-world-trade-organization>. Trump 
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In addition to targeting the WTO, the Trump Administration is tar-
geting China.66 The China theatre demonstrates clearly how the US Gov-
ernment seeks to replace the rule of law with American power. Bringing 
China back67 into the law-based trading system was one of the signal 
achievements of the WTO and was an essential step for the WTO to earn 
the ‘W’ in its moniker. 
China’s WTO accession agreement of 2001 was controversial at the 
time and remains controversial today. In a study I prepared for one of 
the book projects sponsored by the WTO Appellate Body to celebrate its 
10th anniversary in 2005, I criticised the China accession agreement for 
imposing so many applicant WTO-plus rules on China.68 Most commen-
tators in recent years have taken the opposite position, viz, that the na-
tions competing with China should have piled onto China additional 
WTO-plus obligations. In any event, China joined the WTO with its own 
individualised rulebook that entails far more obligations on China than 
any other WTO member Government has. 
China should be held liable in the WTO for any violation of its ac-
cession agreement. Since it joined the WTO in 2001, China has been a 
defendant in only five WTO cases involving its accession commitments, 
and lost four of those cases.69 In my view as an observer of China’s econ-
omy, China’s WTO commitments have been under-enforced by WTO 
Governments. In a study I prepared this year for the European Yearbook 
of International Economic Law, I examined the top 20 economic com-
plaints against China by the Trump Administration.70 I did not seek to 
 
used these words to describe China, but in my view, they are more applicable to US 
misbehaviour. 
66 JM Schlesinger, A Leary, ‘Trump Denounces Both China and WTO’ Wall Street 
Journal (26 July 2019) <www.wsj.com/articles/trump-presses-wto-to-change-china-s-
developing-country-status-11564166423>. 
67 China was an original GATT contracting party in 1947, but then departed the 
GATT after the communist takeover. 
68 S Charnovitz, ‘Mapping the Law of WTO Accession’, in ME Janow, V Donaldson, 
A Yanovich, WTO at Ten: Governance, Dispute Settlement & Developing Countries (Juris 
2008) 855–920. 
69 WTO, DS 363, 394, 431, 517. China also lost the Auto Parts case (DS 339), but in 
the accession component of the case, the violation found by the panel was reversed by 
the Appellate Body. 
70 S Charnovitz, ‘Grading Trump’s China Trade Strategy’ (2019) Eur YB Int’l 
Economic L (forthcoming). A draft of this paper was posted on SSRN on 24 May 2019, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393083>. 
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reach a conclusion as to the veracity of all of those claims, but assuming 
them to be true, I analysed how many of them stated a legal claim for 
which relief could be granted by the WTO. Of the 20 claims, my study 
found that at least 10 involved violations of WTO law, especially the 
WTO law of China accession.71 Yet for those 10 potential US cases 
against China, the Trump Administration brought only two cases. 
Nothing could be more logically inconsistent than the current US 
policy toward China. On the one hand, Vice President Mike Pence con-
stantly accuses China violating ‘the rule of law, and international rules of 
commerce.’72 Yet when the opportunity arose to lodge multiple, broad 
legal claims against China in the one international court that has jurisdic-
tion over China for trade violations, the Trump Administration failed to 
do so.73 Instead of utilising WTO law and the WTO dispute system to 
hold China responsible for its multilateral commitments, the Administra-
tion chose to un-judicialise the dispute and use raw economic power to 
force China to obey US dictates. 
For the other 10 US complaints against China, assuming their valid-
ity, the norms of the trading system provide an opportunity for the US to 
work with likeminded WTO member Governments to strengthen WTO 
rules to cover China’s measures that are allegedly externalising costs on 
other countries (eg, activities by State-owned enterprises). But the Trump 
Administration has not exhibited any more interest in seeking legislative 
solutions regarding China than in seeking judicial solutions. The pre-
ferred solution for the Trump Administration in trade disputes is the 
threat or imposition of unilateral US economic sanctions. The Trump 
Administration’s rejection of WTO legal process is double barrelled: 
first, a failure to bring legal cases against China’s alleged misbehaviour; 
and second, a failure to obey the prohibitions in WTO law against dis-
crimination, unilateral tariffs, and bypassing the WTO dispute system. 
 
71 A recent study reaches the same conclusion that China’s State capitalism can be 
addressed under existing WTO rules. W Zhou, H Gao, X Bai, ‘Building a Market 
Economy through WTO-inspired Reform of State-owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 
68 ICLQ 977–1022. 
72 See Pence (n 62). 
73 S Charnovitz, ‘U.S.-China Talks Ignore Global Trade Rules’ Wall Street Journal 
(17 May 2019) <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-talks-ignore-global-trade-rules-
11558123934>. 
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Of course, disrespect for WTO law is not just misbehaviour practiced 
by the US. The European Union (EU) and China are also disrespecting 
WTO law by imposing tariffs in retaliation against the US Section 232 
steel and aluminium tariffs.74 Although the Section 232 tariffs violate the 
GATT, that violation does not give other countries license to violate the 
GATT in retaliation. Two wrongs do not make a right in trade law (or 
anywhere else). The retaliation by the EU and China violates GATT Ar-
ticles I and II and DSU Article 23. At the time that the US wrongfully 
imposed the Section 232 tariffs in March 2018, there was a colourable 
argument that unilateral retaliation was justifiable under GATT safe-
guard rules. Nevertheless, that GATT Article XIX argument was fore-
closed in an Appellate Body safeguard ruling in August 2018.75 Following 
that (questionable76) ruling, the retaliators should have withdrawn their 
countermeasures immediately. 
In addition, China violates the WTO in its ongoing retaliation against 
the WTO-illegal US Section 301 sanctions. Although China lodged a 
complaint in the WTO against these US tariffs,77 China undermined its 
legal position by retaliating against the US in advance. No other country 
has ever come to WTO dispute settlement with such unclean hands. 
By sidelining law in its campaign against China, the US is committing 
not only a tactical mistake, but also a strategic blunder. The tactical mis-
take is the failure to use the legal and normative tools available to con-
vince China to behave more cooperatively. The strategic blunder comes 
in showing China that what the US is really trying to achieve is the disa-
bling of China’s economy in order to preserve America’s economic su-
premacy. This purpose is consistent with Trump’s ‘National Security 
Strategy’ which accuses China and Russia of ‘attempting to erode 
 
74 USTR has brought WTO cases against the EU (DS 559) and China (DS 558) for 
their anti-Section 232 retaliation. 
75 Charnovitz (n 70). 
76 In my view, the Appellate Body’s decision on this point is not well-reasoned. Yet 
I would hasten to add that my view that the Appellate Body reached the wrong legal 
conclusion does not mean that I share the belief of many US officials and WTO insiders 
that it has acted illegally. Courts do sometimes issue wrong decisions which is why we 
have appellate courts. And the highest appellate court can also issue wrong decisions. 
Unlike the US Supreme Court which is not unwilling to overrule its own precedent, the 
Appellate Body has never admitted past error. 
77 The Section 301 tariffs not only violate arts I and II GATT, but the tariffs also 
violate art 23 DSU. 
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American security and prosperity.’78 Indeed, Trump himself has named 
China an ‘enemy’ of the US.79 
What the world needs now from China is for China to improve its 
respect for the rule of law and for the human rights enshrined in free 
market systems. But those virtues cannot be taught to China by a bully 
who ignores and undermines the WTO judicial system and who employs 
unprecedented market interventions to tilt the playing field in favour of 
protected US industries. The cause of reform in China is not helped by, 
and indeed is hindered by, the everyday hypocrisy that the US shows in 
rejecting world trade law in favour of unilateralism and US exceptional-
ism. As in so many areas, the Trump Administration’s weak tactics dis-
tract attention from the foreign misbehaviour that the Administration is 
seeking to expose. Another example of the underlying US hypocrisy is 
that the Trump Administration inveighs against supposed Chinese mer-
cantilism while demanding that China buy more agricultural exports 
from the US.80 
As the German international law theorist Walther Schücking81 wisely 
predicted in 1912, the ‘modernizing and Europeanizing’ of China will 
lead it to ‘demand full membership within the community of sovereign 
states in every respect.’82 China became an active member of the League 
of Nations,83 and in 1971, China gained a seat in the UN Security Council 
and in numerous UN bodies. Over many decades, skilful diplomacy has 
encouraged and nurtured a willingness in China to play an increasingly 
constructive role in international cooperation on political, economic, en-
vironmental, and social goals. 
 
78 President DJ Trump, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ 
(December 2017) 2 <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-
18-2017-0905.pdf>. 
79 D Chiacu, ‘Enraged Trump likens Fed chief to “Enemy” China’ Reuters (23 
August 2019) <www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-trump/enraged-trump-likens-fed-
chief-to-enemy-china-idUSKCN1VD1XL>. 
80 B Fredericks, ‘China resists Trump’s demand to double farm imports’ New York 
Post (30 October 2019) <https://nypost.com/2019/10/30/china-resists-trumps-demand-
to-double-farm-imports/>. 
81 See M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870–1960 (CUP 2001) 217 (discussing Schücking’s work). 
 82 W Schücking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences (G Fenwich tr, 
Clarendon Press 1918) 243. 
83 AA Kaufman, ‘In Pursuit of Equality and Respect: China’s Diplomacy and the 
League of Nations’ (2014) 40 Modern China 605–38. 
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Unfortunately, the ongoing US campaign to decouple the US and 
Chinese economies and to punish the Chinese people with trade sanc-
tions takes a huge step in the wrong direction. Vice President Pence re-
cently gushed that the Trump Administration wants to build a relation-
ship with China based on ‘candor, fairness and mutual respect,’84 but the 
policies being pursued by Trump and Pence demonstrate the exact op-
posite. China is hardly being shown mutual respect and fairness when 
America’s WTO obligations toward China are being routinely violated. 
The Trump Administration is hardly exhibiting candour when Pence says 
that ‘We are not seeking to contain China’s development’ yet, at the same 
time, his boss Trump orders US firms to leave China.85 
The strategic dangers of punishing China bring to mind the prophetic 
warning of David Jayne Hill in 1919 who criticised the Treaty of Ver-
sailles as a ‘punitive peace’ and a ‘crime against the dignity and sanctity 
of law itself.’86 The missed opportunity, according to Hill, was to have 
written a treaty that would ‘strengthen whatever law-abiding spirit may 
exist in the noblest minds’ of the German people and ‘set them irrevoca-
bly against the military autocracy’ that induced the First World War. Spe-
cifically, Hill called for provisions of law by which the ‘legal rights’ of one 
State toward another could be judicially determined. A century after Hill 
warned of the consequences of failing to establish a rule-based order, the 
WTO legal order between China and the US today is being flouted by 
the Trump Administration in favour of naked projections of US power. 
Such parochial actions to demonise and punish Chinese society will have 
long-term counterproductive consequences. In my view, China’s policies 
of socialist imperialism are more dangerous to the West than its so-called 
State capitalism. 
Besides flubbing its campaign against China, the Trump Administra-
tion’s violations of international law are intended to and are having the 
effect of weakening the entire system of international law and govern-
ance. Diminished international law will lead to a more dangerous, unsta-
ble, and anarchic world order. The continuing pushback against IEcL is 
 
84 Pence (n 62). 
85 ibid; K Bradsher, A Rappeport, ‘Trump Ordered US Companies to Leave China. 
Is that possible?’ New York Times (24 August 2019) <www.nytimes.com/2019/08/24/ 
business/trump-china-trade.html>. 
86 DJ Hill, ‘The Nations and the Law’ (1919) 210 The North American Review 450–
51. 
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just one feature of a broader pushback against global governance and 
international adjudication.87 Ironically, given the higher mondialisation 
of law and economics of the early 21st century as compared to the early 
20th century, contemporary political discourse may manifest more worries 
now about retaining national sovereignty than discourse a century ago. 
Recall Trump’s address to the UN in 2018 when he warned: ‘Around the 
world, responsible nations must defend against threats to sovereignty not 
just from global governance, but also from other, new forms of coercion 
and domination.’88 
If the revanchist attitudes about sovereignty were just a fixation of 
populist politicians and street protestors, that would be bad enough. But 
the most troubling aspect of the sovereigntist movement is the way that 
academics have bought into the paradigm that there is a trade-off be-
tween national sovereignty and international law. One sees this syndrome 
in the scholarly international relations and international law literature 
that purports to assess the so-called ‘sovereignty costs’ of treaties.89 Im-
portantly, some legal academics have criticised these accounts by explain-
ing instead how joint rulemaking in treaties can enhance sovereignty.90 
In my view, the best pronouncement on national sovereignty came in 
1923, when the PCIJ declared in the Wimbledon case that it ‘declines to 
see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to per-
form or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its 
sovereignty.’91 Instead, the Court explained: ‘… the right of entering into 
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’92 
The rejection of the WTO and the trumpeting of sovereignty are two 
examples of the ongoing degeneration of the ambition of international 
 
87 See C McLachlan, ‘The Assault on International Adjudication and the Limits of 
Withdrawal’ (2019) 67 ICLQ 499–537. 
88 President DJ Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly’ (25 September 2018) <www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-
assembly-new-york-ny/>. 
89 See KW Abbott, D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ 
(2000) 54 Int’l Organization 421–24 (introducing the term ‘sovereignty costs’). 
90 K Raustiala, ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’ 
(2003) 6 J Int’l Economic L 841–78; O Hathaway, ‘International Delegation and 
Domestic Sovereignty’ (2008) 71 L & Contemporary Problems 115–50. 
91 PCIJ, Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon”, 17 August 1923, Series A No 1, 25. 
92 ibid. 
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law. Yet the most prominent example is the climate regime which has 
allowed itself to be hollowed out in the Paris Agreement of 2015. 
Despite its infirmities, the WTO amalgamates the key elements of in-
ternational lawmaking that were developed over the 19th and 20th centu-
ries. To wit, the WTO contains substantive rules, specific commitments 
based on reciprocity, dispute settlement, and enforcement. By contrast, 
none of those crucial features are present to any significant degree in the 
Paris Agreement.93 
Of course, no single template is optimal for all international regimes. 
The architecture utilised in each of them should respond to the nature of 
the transborder challenge and the role of cooperation in solving it. For 
example, in the trading system, many of the benefits of international trade 
are divisible and can be obtained by a Government liberalising at home. 
Yet in the climate regime, the opposite situation exists. The avoidance of 
global warming is not divisible and achieving it requires the cooperation 
of the largest emitting nations. So, given this fundamental difference, one 
might expect the climate regime to mandate a much higher degree of 
multilateral cooperation than the trade regime. Yet the architecture of 
the climate regime is not based on that logic. Unlike the WTO, the Paris 
Agreement omits all of the important ingredients – including rules, reci-
procity, and enforcement – of the formula for treaty success. Instead, the 
‘Paris Paradigm’ is centred on ‘self-determined mitigation contributions’ 
for which governments ‘are not legally obligated to achieve.’94 
Ironically, the only procedural obligation with bite in the Paris Agree-
ment is the rule forbidding withdrawal from the treaty for three years 
after ratification and then only after giving a one-year notice.95 In con-
trast, Article XV of the WTO Agreement permits withdrawal at any time 
with only a half-year notice. In my view, treaties can trench on national 
sovereignty if they seek to prevent States (and future policymakers within 
States) from easily exiting the treaty. Ideally, the adhesion to a treaty 
should come from the mutual benefits gained from it, not a padlock on 
the fire exit. 
 
93 The Paris Agreement contains some procedural and transparency rules, but no 
substantive rules on actions Governments need to take in parallel (eg, a carbon tax) to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
94 L Rajamani, D Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing International 
Prescriptiveness with National Discretion’ (2019) 68 ICLQ 1023–40. 
95 Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, art 28. 
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For multilateral trade negotiations, we often hear about the negotiat-
ing failure in Geneva. Yet for climate change, the prevailing narrative is 
of a huge negotiating success in Paris. That the trade regime is held to a 
much higher standard than the climate regime can be seen most clearly if 
one imagines exporting the Paris technique to Geneva. Suppose the 
Doha Round recommenced based on new climate-style negotiating mo-
dalities that sought to achieve outcomes that are non-binding,96 non-rule 
based, not susceptible to dispute settlement, and that entail no reciprocal 
commitments. Would such a game-plan satisfy the WTO? Obviously not. 
Trade ministers and import/export groups would not accept such a 
voluntary arrangement for trade even though environmental ministers 
and environmental groups accepted and continue to be enthusiastic 
about the non-binding Paris Agreement. This story would be just an 
amusing case study of institutional irrationality if the stakes in climate 
change were commensurate to the stakes in the Doha Round. Unfortu-
nately, the stakes in climate change are many times higher than the stakes 
ever were in the Doha Round. That’s why the climate regime’s choice of 
potluck governance over legal governance is so maddening: because the 
pathologies of the Paris Agreement make planetary ecological failure a 
much more likely outcome. 
 
 
4.  A plan for strengthening the WTO 
 
The advent of the WTO’s silver anniversary provides an opportunity 
to update the structure and function of the WTO to reflect what has been 
learned during the WTO’s first 25 years. President Trump told the UN 
in 2019 that ‘the World Trade Organization needs drastic change,’97 but 
he has not communicated to the WTO a broad agenda for reform. The 
only US initiative that has come to my attention is Trump’s directive to 
USTR ‘to secure changes at the WTO that would prevent self-declared 
 
96 In other words, the binding and negotiated WTO schedules of goods and services 
commitments would be replaced by non-binding, unilateral schedules of ‘nationally 
determined contributions’ of the type relied upon in the Paris Agreement. 
97 President DJ Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly’ (25 September 2019) <www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-
assembly/>. 
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developing countries from availing themselves of flexibilities in WTO 
rules and negotiations that are not justified by appropriate economic and 
other indicators.’98 In my view, such changes are needed in the WTO. 
Some have said that the WTO needs stronger instruments to prevent 
trade wars, but count me as sceptical. Previous multilateral efforts to out-
law military war such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or even the UN Charter 
were not as successful as their advocates hoped. For the same reasons, 
tightening Article 23 DSU will not be enough to stop WTO members 
from waging trade wars against each other if that is what such Govern-
ments want to do. 
The failure of the WTO to prevent US trade sanctions against China 
raises an interesting question as to whether China would have a cognisa-
ble non-violation claim against the WTO. The cause of action for such a 
non-violation claim would be that in accepting the WTO’s terms for join-
ing the trading system, China gained legitimate expectations that its con-
tractual rights would be honoured in the WTO, an expectation that has 
been dashed by the Section 301 sanctions. Certainly, China could also 
make a violation claim against the US that Section 301 ‘as such’ and ‘as 
applied’ violates the WTO.99 But since the Trump Administration has 
asserted publicly its tariffs do not violate the WTO,100 then China could 
also bring a non-violation claim against the US and possibly other WTO 
members too. (I presume that the WTO itself is immune from accounta-
bility in WTO dispute settlement.) 
The ITO Charter of 1948 was authored by the UN Conference on 
Trade and Employment. Based on that dual purpose, the Charter recog-
nised the need for: (1) ‘internal measures’ for ‘the maintenance in each 
country of useful employment opportunities for those able and willing to 
work’ and (2) ‘concerted action … to sustain employment,’ to recognise 
the ‘rights of workers,’ and to maintain ‘fair labor standards.’101 The idea 
of linking trade and employment policy was promoted by postwar plan-
ners during World War II. For example, in April 1945, the Economic 
 
98 White House (n 65). 
99 An ongoing dispute (DS 543) exists, but since China has failed to engage in best 
practices in WTO transparency by releasing its briefs, I do not know whether China has 
levied ‘as such’ claims against Section 301. 
100 The US tariffs are said to be justified as a way to counter behaviour by China that 
is alleged to fall outside of the WTO rulebook. 
101 Arts 1–9 ITO Charter. 
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and Financial Committees of the League of Nations declared that ‘inter-
national trade negotiations can be linked with measures for ensuring high 
and stable levels of employment’ in order to ‘better their chances of suc-
cess.’102 
Unfortunately, the international employment goals were lost to the 
trading system when the ITO failed to go into force.103 As salient as they 
were in 1948, these goals may be even more salient today in a more glob-
ally interconnected world. Better late than never, a treatment for the 
scourge of unemployment could now be revaccinated into the trading 
system by a WTO amendment. 
Thus, one way that the WTO can be substantively improved is to em-
bed a commitment to fostering worker adjustment to the impact of trade. 
Doing so could respond to the trends in trade politics that have criticised 
open trade and trade agreements for dis-employing workers and worsen-
ing social unfairness. Of course, such criticisms are more properly 
blamed on the weaknesses of the international employment regime than 
on the WTO itself.104 While I have long advocated ‘strengthening the in-
ternational employment regime,’105 including on the problem of techno-
logical unemployment, I see no prospect for that vision. Given this real-
ity, I continue to advocate a second-best solution of expanding the trad-
ing system to address some trade-related employment matters. 
A popular thesis about the GATT and the WTO is that these treaties 
reflect ‘embedded liberalism,’ a term introduced by the US political sci-
entist John Ruggie in 1982. The idea of ‘embedded liberalism’ is that the 
liberalism of international trade plus the liberalism of Government poli-
cies ‘to contain and share the social adjustment costs’ of open markets 
 
102 Economic and Financial Committees of the League of Nations (n 22) 29. 
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104 ‘Trade and employment’ was the original ‘trade-and’ issue, a term that became 
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105 See S Charnovitz, ‘Strengthening the International Employment Regime’ (1995) 
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were jointly embedded into postwar multilateralism.106 Although Rug-
gie’s theory was appropriately nuanced, some followers of Ruggie over 
the past 25 years have made broader claims that the WTO itself manifests 
embedded liberalism.107 
In my view, such errant claims about the WTO miss the point. Al-
though the WTO was predicated on the liberalism of international trade, 
the WTO is not predicated on the liberalism of domestic Government 
intervention to contain social adjustment costs. The ITO of 1948 had 
such a predicate, as Ruggie himself acknowledged, but those commit-
ments did not find their way into the GATT. Then, in the early 1990s, 
when an opportunity arose to rescue the ITO’s lost employment goals, 
the GATT Governments failed to embed them into the WTO. Thus, the 
WTO is more accurately characterised as ‘un-embedded liberalism’ than 
as ‘embedded liberalism.’ 
If employment issues are added to the WTO’s wheelhouse, then how 
about environmental issues? While a case can be made to graft sustaina-
ble development onto the WTO’s mission, there is a much better solution 
which is to strengthen the multilateral environmental regime.108 Unlike 
the problem of worker adjustment to trade where a viable second-best 
role for the WTO could exist, inserting climate change or other ecologi-
cal challenges into the WTO does not constitute a viable second-best ap-
proach for fixing dysfunctional global environmental governance. To 
paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, the environment is too important to be 
left to trade ministers. 
Besides the addition of worker adjustment policy, the mission of the 
WTO should also be expanded to provide better rules for nonmarket 
economies. Although mainstream commentary persistently argues that 
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international trade rules are insufficient to discipline how State capital-
ism externalises costs on other countries, I have seen little effort by ana-
lysts preoccupied with worries about China to propose treaty language 
for how WTO rules could be improved.109 Drafting such language is even 
harder than it may initially appear because any multilateral rules have to 
be written to apply to all countries (including the hyper-mercantilist US), 
not just China.110 
Given how the WTO in 2004 shut down its talks on the Doha Round 
issues of investment and competition, the WTO may lack the capacity to 
prescribe new rules governing State capitalism and mercantilism. So, if 
new multilateral disciplines are to be designed, that reform exercise may 
need to occur outside of the WTO. The venues for doing so could in-
clude the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and/or private initiative. 
The recently published Joint Statement ‘US–China Trade Relations – 
A Way Forward’111 by 30 scholars, located in China, Europe, and the US, 
provides an example of how private initiative could constructively seek 
to give direction to governments. In my view, the so-called China di-
lemma is just a contemporary manifestation of a long-recognised IEcL 
problem analysed many decades ago by Professor John H Jackson. For 
Jackson, trade between countries with markedly different economic sys-
tems presented a political and economic challenge that he termed the ‘in-
terface’ problem.112 The China Joint Statement does not build on (or even 
mention) Jackson’s pioneering work by analysing the successes and fail-
ures in the ways in which the trading system has developed responses to 
the interface problem. Nor does the Statement recommend any specific 
revisions in WTO law. 
 Instead, the Statement cautions against ‘using global rules or bar-
gaining pressures that are perceived as intruding on a country’s sovereign 
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right to make its own domestic policy choices.’113 This invocation of sov-
ereignty by the Statement’s authors – including six law professors – is 
especially troubling as IEcL has always been premised on using sover-
eignty to solve collective problems rather than using sovereignty as an 
excuse to not solve such problems. The Statement admits that nations 
should not have ‘absolute free rein’ to ‘impose unfair extraterritorial costs 
onto other nations,’ and to its credit, the Statement calls for prohibiting 
national actions ‘likely to create significant distortions in global mar-
kets.’114 But instead of offering a plan for doing so, the Statement instead 
puts forward ‘an alternative intellectual framework’ and a ‘conceptual 
vocabulary’ interspersed with platitudes about ‘policy space.’115 Sadly, for 
such a distinguished group, this was a missed opportunity to engage in 
the analytical heavy lifting needed to write better global law to address 
the problems of State capitalism. 
The challenges of regulating competition should be decomposed 
whenever possible and addressed one by one. Many discrete issues might 
be amenable to negotiations inside or alongside the WTO. Among the 
most pressing issues are: digital trade, investment protectionism, and 
commodity/overcapacity agreements. 
For these and any other trade agenda issues, the WTO should not 
insist upon consensus decisionmaking. Rather, the WTO should be open 
to negotiating new Codes among likeminded Governments. By a Code, I 
mean a side agreement among willing countries. If a group of WTO 
members want to establish mutual higher obligations to do X, there is no 
bar in WTO law against that provided that X does not violate the WTO. 
Best practice for such Codes would be open plurilateralism – viz, a com-
mitment to allow additional countries to join the Code on equal terms. 
In my view, such a Code could be enforced through an arbitration clause. 
What a Code cannot do under WTO law is to discriminate against 
non-parties to the Code. Without being able to discriminate, Code writ-
ers face the classic problem of free riders who would seek to stay out of 
the Code while enjoying the benefits of the adherence of other countries 
to higher obligations.116 Free rider problems of this sort can be difficult 
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to fix because the MFN principle prevents the exclusion of non-parties 
to certain benefits of a Code. Recent efforts to promote a ‘club’ of Gov-
ernments on climate change117 founder on MFN obligations. 
But the WTO also contains a pathway for potentially overriding 
MFN. If governmental membership in a Code is high enough, then Code 
parties could seek WTO Ministerial Conference approval of a long-term 
WTO waiver to permit justifiable MFN violations. Legislating a WTO 
waiver requires a three-fourths vote of WTO members.118 This is a for-
midable obstacle, but not an insuperable one. The math works best when 
there is an agreement of most WTO members to move forward despite 
resistance by only a few countries. The math fails if a Code is supported 
only by a discrete group of countries. So that legal parameter sets the 
terms for new WTO negotiations. The mass that is critical in a critical 
mass agreement is not just an economic quantity like percent of world 
trade. The critical mass is also a political quantity, that is, enough votes 
to approve a WTO waiver when needed. 
Besides these proposals for the reform of substantive WTO law, let 
me also offer a few proposals for WTO institutional reform. I wish the 
WTO had not been so resistant over the past 25 years to grow its roots 
into domestic polities in order to gain support from elected officials, the 
business community, and economic and social actors. By maintaining, 
and even worse, glorifying, the virtues of top-down State centricity, the 
WTO has failed to nurture a reservoir of support from civic society and 
industry. The costs of not enjoying such grass roots support may be hid-
den until the WTO gets into a jam. Compare the lack of public support 
for the WTO to the wellspring of support for the (underequipped) Paris 
Agreement by subnational Governments, nongovernmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), the enlightened private sector, and the media. 
Although international organisations have traditionally linked to the 
executive branches of States, broader connections are possible. An early 
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attention to the distinctive role of branches came in 1912 with Professor 
Schücking’s proposal for delegations of national Parliaments to ‘meet by 
the side of the conference of states’ in ‘a later stage of development of the 
international organization ….’119 In 2003, the Interparliamentary Union 
and the European Parliament began co-sponsoring regular meetings of a 
Parliamentary Conference on the WTO alongside of WTO Ministerial 
Conferences.120 These meetings have been interesting to observe, but the 
full potential of this exercise in international democratic governance re-
mains to evolve in the future. The WTO’s judicial branch should also 
seek connections to national Governments via a transnational judicial di-
alogue of domestic and WTO judges. To the extent that the prevailing 
narrative of a runaway Appellate Body has any validity, then having a 
forum whereby WTO judges receive constructive feedback from national 
judges might help to solve the alleged problem. 
The State centricity of the WTO, typically involving only ministries 
of trade or commerce, leads to another political difficulty which is the 
narrowness of outlook available to solve collective action and global com-
mons problems. Constructive ideas in international affairs do not usually 
originate in government bureaucracies, but rather emerge from business 
organisations, civic society, research institutes, foundations, universities, 
and innovative individuals. In the GATT era, the trading system hid from 
nonbureaucratic influences. To its credit, the WTO has sponsored an an-
nual Public Forum which serves as a best practice for any international 
organisation seeking to institutionalise a way for economic and social ac-
tors, particularly transnational actors, to provide input into the organisa-
tion. Still, the WTO could do much more than it has to institutionalise 
effective NGO participation. Unlike the debate on NGOs 20 years ago,121 
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there could be no serious argument today that NGO participation would 
render the WTO less effective than it currently is. 
In conclusion, the WTO is beset by major challenges. The Trump 
Administration has launched a vituperative public campaign against the 
WTO and has weaponised tariffs against China and tariff threats against 
numerous countries. Through capable leadership by Director-General 
Roberto Azevêdo, the WTO seeks to remain afloat and operate under its 
own power. Yet damaging failures continue to occur. Despite the re-
quirement in Article IV(1) of the WTO Agreement to hold a Ministerial 
Conference at least once every two years, the WTO prorogated the legis-
lative Conference that should have been held in 2019. In the near future, 
the Standing Appellate Body may no longer remain standing. The ensu-
ing disruption of WTO dispute settlement will put even greater stress on 
the WTO. Moreover, Trump’s animosity against the WTO is hardly de-
pleted. Should President Trump be elected to a second term, USTR may 
block the appointment of a new Director-General after Azevêdo’s term 
ends in September 2021. Worse still, there may be a US withdrawal from 
the WTO (‘Uexit’). I hope that whatever tumult ensues, the world com-
munity will be able to keep the WTO. Yet even in the worst case, while 
the WTO can be dismantled, it cannot be disinvented. 
